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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
adopted in 1783, provided that the two States should have concur-
rent jurisdiction in and upon the water of that river. Of so little
importance, however, was this regulation that it was not until so
lately as 1856 that a law of this State was passed for the punish-
ment of offences committed on that river.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
1
Assignment for henefit of Creditors.-An agreement of lease by which
the Philadelphia and Sunbury Railroad Company placed its entire road in
the possession of the Sunbury and Erie Railroad Company, to be stocked,
repaired, and run at certain rates of tolls, and after applying the proceeds
to these objects, so far as necessary, then to pay the earnings remaining
to certain preferred creditors of the Philadelphia and Sunbury Railroad
Company, lessors, is an assignment for the benefit of creditors, within the
meaning of the Act 24th March, 1818, and, having been recorded within
thirty days from its date, in the county wherein the road of the lessors
was situated, is good as an assignment, though not intended as such by
the parties: Bittenbander vs. Snbury and Erie Railroad Company.
The preferences in the assignment are void because forbidden by law;
but for all other purposes, the assignment is good, and is not avoided, if
the railroad company's lessee had no power under their charter to act as
trustee; for, if so, the courts would supply a trustee who was competent:
Id.
An assignment, like a grant, mayr be made of any property of which
the assignor has the actual or potential possession; and the road of the
Philadelphia and Sunbury Railroad Company being property in posses-
sion, and its future earnings potential, capable of being inventoried and
appraised under the Act of Assembly relating to assignments, both interests
passed to and vested in the Sunbury and Erie Railroad Company for the
purposes of the agreement, the legal effect of which was an assignment in
the trust for creditors : Id.
The operative words of the instrument were not an assignment directly
I From Robert E. Wright, Esq., State Reporter, to be reported in the 4th volume
of his Reports.
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to the preferred creditors, but to the Sunbury and Erie Railroad Company,
for them; the possession of the road was granted as property to the latter
company as trustee under an express trust for the benefit of creditors: the
lease, therefore, possessing all the elements of an assignment, must be
construed as such: i.d.
Where one of the preferred creditors, whose bill was against the Phila-
delphia and Sunbury Railroad Company for repairs of the rolling stock,
continued work for the Sunbury and Erie Railroad Company after they
had taken possession, upon the promise of the president to pay him as
prescribed in the agreement of lease, and, upon failure of payment, brought
his action of assumpsit against the latter company, proving the agreement,
and that the lessors had received net profits sufficient to meet his claim,
it was
Beld, that the agreement of lease being but an assignment for the
benefit of creditors, and the preference therein in the plaintiff's favor
being void, though the work had been done for repairs of the rolling
stock, the promise of the assignee to pay according to the preferences
therein expressed, was but a promise to execute the assignment, and not
such as could be enforced against the Sunbury and Erie Railroad Com-
pany, whose president was the promissor: rd.
Bailment-Pledge-- Warranty of Tide.-A pledgor, by the act of
pledging, impliedly engages that he is the owner of the property pledged;
and where the ownership of any part of it is not in him, he is liable to the
pledgee in damages, if by reason of defective title it is taken from him:
.Aairs vs. Taylor.
B., the owner of a lot of sheep in Ohio, executed a chattel mortgage to
T. to secure purchase-money, and afterwards sold to M. 350 of them at 83
per head, T. agreeing to release the lien of his mortgage upon those
bought by D., who agreed to pay him a certain sum "upon the arrival
of the sheep at Pittsburgh, and to allow T. to hold possession of the sheep
until said sum was paid." While on the road, in T.'s possession, 200 of
them were replevied by another party on a claim of lien on them as against
B., and the remainder taken to the place mentioned, where D1. demanded
the whole number, tendering the sum agreed on, which T. was willing to
receive, and to deliver the 150 sheep still in his possession. M. refused
this offer, and brought replevin. On ease stated, in the replevin suit, the
Court entered judgment for the defendant for the value of the sheep at
the price agreed to be paid.
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.eld, that the entry of the judgment was not error: Id.
Chattel lortgage--Decedent.-Where, under a mortgage of chattels,
the mortgagee having the right to take possession and sell on default in
payment, did, upon such default, after death of mortgagor, take possession
of and sell the chattels mortgaged, it was .eid, That an action of trover
would lie against him, by the administrator of the decedent, to recover the
value of the goods sold: Kater vs. ,Steinruck's Administrator.
On the death of a mortgagor, his personal estate in possession passes
into the custody of the law, to be administered for the benefit of all parties,
and the mortgagee has no right to take it in satisfaction of his own debt,
whether sufficient property has been left by the decedent to pay the debts
or not: Id.
The mortgagee in such case cannot, in the action of trover, set off the
debt due him by the mortgagor against the value of the property con-
verted; because, to allow the set-off, would be to sanction the seizure of
the property, and would mix the remedies of tort and debt in the same
action : Id.
Constitutional Law-Stay Law.-The proviso of the first section of the
Act 21st May 1861, granting stay of execution, under certain conditions,
on "all judgments or debts upon which stay of execution has been or may
be waived by the debtor in any original obligation or contract upon which
such judgment has been or may hereafter be obtained," is unconstitu-
tional, being in conflict with Section 10, Art. I., of the Constitution of the
United States, and with Section 17, Article IX., of the Constitution of
Pennsylvania: Bilmeyer vs. Evans & Rodenbaugh.
Where the defendants, on the 12th July 1860, signed a sealed bill
authorizing the entry of judgment against them for $1000, payable twelve
months after date, "without stay of execution after the day of payment,"
the release of their statutory right to a further stay became a part of the
contract, and, as such, could not be impaired or altered by the legislature;
therefore, where the Court of Common Pleas, after the day of payment,
granted an additional stay of execution under the Act 21st May 1861, it
was error: Id.
If the parties to a contract include in it the legal remedy by which it
is to be enforced, a legislative enactment changing the remedial process
agreed on in regard to that contract, is as clearly unconstitutional as the
attempt to impair the obligation of any other contract: Id.
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Criminal Law-Peremptory Mallenges- Trial by Jury- Constitutional
Law.-The allowance of four peremptory challenges, under the "Criminal
Procedure Act" of 1860, does not conflict with the constitutional provi-
sion "that trials by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof
remain inviolate :" Bartzell vs. Commonwealth.
Where the peremptory challenges on the part of the Commonwealth
exhaust the jury selected from the regular "Ten ire," and talesmen are
called from the bystanders, the prisoner is not thereby deprived of a trial
by jury, "as heretofore," under the constitution; for if the Commonwealth
have the right to challenge, the legal consequences which flow from its
exercise cannot affect the right itself, and the right existing, its incidents
are legal, one of which is the callirg and impannelling talesmen: Id.
The Commonwealth is not compelled to exercise her right of challenge,
in the order of calling the jury, so that if the challenges to the first four
called are waived she cannot afterwards challenge, but is entitled to four
peremptory challenges out of all the jurors that may be called at any time
before the panel is full, and passing by individual jurors, and permitting
them to be challenged by the prisoner or sworn, is no waiver of the right:
Id.
Deed-Subscribing Witness- Opinion as to Capacity-Though sub-
scribing witnesses to a will may be asked their opinion of the testator's
capacity to make a will, at the time of their attesting it, yet in ease of a
deed they must testify to facts only on the point of the sanity or capacity
of the grantor; they cannot give their opinion as to his competency to
contract, for the execution of the deed is all that is attested by them:
Dean vs. Fuller.
Therefore it was not error in the Court below to overrule questions pro-
pounded to the subscribing witness in a deed, "whether in his opinion
the plaintiff had an unusual or undue influence upon" the grantor "at the
time of the execution of the deed," and "whether in your opinion was
' the grantor' in a fit condition to make the deed to ' the grantee' or to
deal with him at all at the time ;" for the facts to show undue influence
were for the jury, who alone were to draw the conclusion whether or not
it existed, while the questions offered, if admitted, would have proved the
conclusion without the facts: Id.
Where the ,evidence offered to set aside a deed was not such as would
justify a chancellor in decreeing its cancellation, or a common law court
in declaring it inoperative, no fraud, legal incapacity, or mistake being
shown, it was not error to direct the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff,
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who, in an action of ejectment brought by him to recover the land con-
veyed, therein, claimed under the, alleged fraudulent deed. Insufficient
evidence need not be submitted to a jury: Id.
COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF NEW ZJESEY.1
Will.-Beirs, when construed next of Kin.-Testatrix was possessed of
personal and real estate, and by her will directed the latter should be sold
by her executors, and after giving numerous pecuniary legacies, principal-
ly among her relatives and the relatives of her deceased husband, she
added, "and if there is anything over and above left, let it be equally
divided among all the heirs.
Held, that the word heirs, in the above connection, means "next of
kin." Jane Scudder's Executors vs. Isaac Yanarsdale and others.
Where money or personal property is bequeathed to the heirs of A. or
to the heirs of the testator, if there be nothing in the will showing that
the testator used the word in a different sense, the next of kin are enti-
tled to claim under the description as the persons appointed by law to
succeed to personal property: Id.
Infant.-Right of Father to Custody.- Constitutional Law.-At common
law the father, in the first instance, is entitled to the custody of his child-
ren, but courts will exercise a sound discretion for the benefit of the
children in disposing of their custody : Bennet vs. Bennet.
The act of the 20th of March 1860, has materially altered the rule
of the common law, and has, to a certain extent, deprived the court of this
exercise of its discretion in disposing of the custody of children. By
this act the custody of the children within the age of seven years is trans-
ferred from the father to the mother: Id.
This act is not unconstitutional, nor is it void as being incompatible
with the fundamental principles of government: Id.
Deed.- Cancellation does not divest Estate,--urchaser with Notice.-
The question is well settled at common law that the cancellation of a deed
by consent of parties will not divest the grantee, and revest in the grantor
an estate which has once vested: Harris Wilson vs. Josiah Bill and
Catharine his wife and Frances Watts.
1 From Mercer Beasley, Esq., Reporter of the Court, to be reported in the 2d
volume of his Reports.
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The title to lands vested in a married woman by an unrecorded deed
cannot be divested by her parol consent that such deed may be cancelled,
and a conveyance made by her grantor to her husband: Td.
A feme covert was seised of certain lands. She being ill, consented, at
the solicitation of her husband, to the cancellation of her deed and to a
conveyance from her grantor to her husband. During her lifetime her
husband married a second wife. Being imprisoned on charge of bigamy,
he and his mistress reconveyed the lands to his wife, she and her husband
executing a mortgage for the benefit of the husband to a third party; this
mortgage was afterwards assigned to complainant, who was a lawyer, the
counsel of the husband, and had knowledge that the property. had been
held by the husband in trust, and that the mortgage was also held in trust
for the husband-it was hld that the complainant had sufficient knowledge
to put him on inquiry; that he was not a. bona fide holder, and that the
mortgage was void in his hands: Id.
Married Woman-Power to Contract.-Liabilities voluntarily incurred
by a married woman will be charged upon her separate estate, but she
cannot by her contract make herself personally liable: Pentz vs. Simonson
and Wife.
The act of 1857, which provides that a feme covert may covenant as to
the title of her lands, affords the strongest legislative construction that
the act of 1852 does not by necessary implication confer upon her the
right to dispose of her real estate, or to make contracts in regard to it: Id.
A contract entered into by a married woman for the sale of her estate
cannot be enforced: Id.
But equity will charge her separate property with the repayment of
money advanced to the wife, at her instance and for her benefit, or on
account of her estate: Id.
Subrogation-Married oman-Separate Estate.-To entitle a party
who pays the debt of another to the rights of the creditor by subrogation,
the debt must be paid at the instance of the debtor, or the person paying
it must be liable as surety or otherwise for its payment: Garret Wilson
vs. William Brown and Xary Ann Brown, his Wife.
Where the title to land is in a married woman as her separate property,
she and her husband living separate, and money is paid and advanced at
her instance and for her benefit, a mortgage executed by her alone to
secure such advances will be a valid and equitable lien on such property:
Id.
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Interest-Mortgage.-A decree will bear only six per cent. interest,
although founded on a mortgage drawing seven per cent.: Wion vs.
Marsh.
Decrees in equity, as well as judgments at law, universally bear the
legal rate of interest, without regard to the terms of the contract or to the
place where it was executed, whether within the state or abroad: id.
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.'
Shipping- General Average-Bill for Contr bution.-The owners of a
vessel may maintain a bill in equity to recover contribution from the
owners of the cargo, if the master, in order to avoid the danger of being
driven, broadside on, upon a reef, sacrifices the chance of saving her from
this peril, and runs her over the reef and upon the beach, and thus saves a
portioli of the cargo which would have been lost, if she had gone to pieces
upon the reef: Aferithew vs. Sampson.
A claim for contribution may be maintained against the owners of a
cargo, although .the vessel is totally lost: Id.
Criminal Law-Passing Counterfeit Honey-Pleading.-It is no vari-
ance to allege that a counterfeit bank bill was uttered and passed as true
to a person to whom it was actually delivered by the defendant as a true
bill, although that person was only the servant of another and had no
interest in the transaction: Commonwealth vs. Starr.
If a counterfeit bank bill is uttered and passed as true to a person who
in taking it acts only as the servant of another, and has no interest in the
transaction, the jury may nevertheless find as a fact an intent to defraud
that person, if the defendant did not know him to be a servant, and dealt
with him as a principal; although the evidence would also support an
allegation of an intent to defraud the unknown master: Id.
Criminal-Larceny of Gas.-Illuminating gas may be the subject of
larceny: Commonwealth vs. Shaw.
Larceny of illuminating gas may be committed by a person on his own
land, by secretly opening a gas company's service-pipe which was laid
there for the purpose of supplying his house with gas, and connecting the
same with another pipe, through which he secretly and fraudulently re-
I From Charles Allen, Esq., State Reporter; to be published in the forthcoming
volume of his Reports.
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ceives and uses the company's gas, after they have closed their service-
pipe and removed their meter, and given him notice thereof : Id.
Criminal Law-Murder--Aiding to commit Suicide.-Aiding another
to commit suicide is murder: Commonwealth vs. Pratt.
Promissory Note-Invalidjity of Indorsement.-In an action by the
indorsee against the maker of a promissory note, the defendant cannot
show in defence that the plaintiff procured the indorsement by undue
influence from the payee, when he was of unsound mind and incapable
of making a valid indorsement, if the payee or his legal representatives
have never disaffirmed it; or that the payee, for a valuable consideration,
had agreed to give up the note at his death to the maker, reserving
meanwhile the right to collect the interest thereon: Carrier vs. Sears.
Decedent-Order of Sale for Payment of Debts.-An administrator
cannot maintain a petition for leave to sell real estate for the payment of
debts of his intestate, if there are no debts due from the estate which can
be enforced at law: Lamson vs. Schutt.
Guardian and Ward-Liability for Spport.-In the absence of an
express contract, no action can be sustained against a guardian to charge
him personally with the support and education of his ward. And if he
has permitted his ward to remain in the care and custody of another,
without any express contract for any definite period of time, he may ter-
minate his personal liability to pay for their support and education by
giving notice to that effect, although at the time of giving notice the ward
is sick and unable to be removed: Spring vs. Woodworth.
Guardian and Ward-Effect of Foreign Appointment.-One who has
been appointed under the laws of another state to be the guardian of a
child whose legal domicil is in that state, has no absolute right to the
custody of the person of his ward in this Commonwealth; but his official
position will be considered by the Court as an important element in deter-
mining to whom the custody of the child shall be granted: Woodworth vs.
Spring.
The appointment in this Commonwealth of a guardian over a child
whose legal domicil is in another State, and who has a guardian appointed
under the laws of that State, does not deprive this Court of the power,
in its discretion, to decree the custody of the child to the foreign guar-
dian: Id.
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Criminal Law-Evidence of Wfe.-In the trial of a complaint against
a man for an assault and battery upon his wife, she is a competent wit-
ness in his favor: Commonwealth vs. Muryhy.
Lost Note-Action by Holder.-The owner of a lost note cannot main.
tan an action at law against the indorser, in a case where a bond to indem-
nify the defendant against being called on a second time to pay the note
would not afford to him an adequate protection: Tuttle vs. Standish.
Town-Liability for Defective .fighway.-A town is not responsible in
damages if a horse, being frightened by an accident, breaks away from
'his driver and escapes from all control, and afterwards, while running at
large, meets with an injury through a defect in a highway: Davis vs.
Dudley.
Will-Construction-Peretuity.-Under a will which, after various
specific devises and bequests, contains the following provision: "If any-
thing remains, my will is that the residue shall be deposited in the
Worcester Savings Bank, and to be appropriated by my executors to the
relief of my heirs, if they at any time shall need pecuniary assistance;"
the entire beneficial interest in the residue vests in those who are the
heirs at law of the testator at the time of his death, and, if they all desire
it, and the executors consent, the trust may be annulled, and the property
distributed amongst them, upon their executing a release to the execu-
tors: Smith vs. Harrington.
Note payable in Instalments-Indorsement when overdue-AMortgage.-
A note payable by instalments is overdue when the first instalment is
overdue and unpaid; and one who takes it afterwards takes it subject to
all equities between the original parties: Vinton vs. King.
The same defences may be made in an action on a mortgage, the Sta-
tute of Limitations excepted, which might be made in an action on the
debt which the mortgage was given to secure: Id.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORKj
Actions by Public Officers-Facts assumed to be true on the Trial.-
Actions by public officers, as such, should be brought in their individual
names, with the title of their office added: -Paige vs. Fazerckerly.
1 From the Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter of the Court.
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If, in an action brought by one as "chamberlain, &e.," no objection is
taken, on the trial, that the plaintiff is not chamberlain, it will be assumed,
on appeal, that the fact of his being the incumbent of the office was under-
stood, or taken for granted: Id.
When it is obvious that a fact was assumed on the trial, it is as much
in the case as if it were expressly proved: Id.
When a court of review is satisfied, from the general scope and tenor of
the proceedings on the trial, that a particular fact was not a matter of
contest, nor a ground of objection there, but was assumed or taken for
granted in the conduct of the cause, it may and should, conclude that the
fact was as it was assumed to be: Id.
Fire Insurance-Material Stiulations.-Evidence of Assent to other
lnsurances.-A stipulation, in a Npolicy of insurance, that the insurance
shall be void, in case the assured, or any other person with his knowledge,
shall have or make any other insurance on the property, not notified to
the insurers, and mentioned in, or indorsed upon, the policy, is a material
part of the contract between the parties: Gilbert vs. The Phoenix In-
surance Company.
The parties to a contract of insurance have the right to stipulate,
between themselves, as to the nature and kind of evidence by which the
assent of the insurers to other insurances shall be manifested. And
when they have thus stipulated, the court has no power to substitute any
other kind of evidence, differing in kind or degree: Id.
Variance-False Representaions.-When it appears that the defendant
was not, and could not have been, misled by a variance between the com-
plaint and the proof, the variance may be disregarded, without amend-
ment: Craig vs. Ward et al.
A party making a representation false in fact renders himself liable in
an action for fraud, although he did not actually know the representation
to be false at the time: Id.
If a party makes a material representation, without knowing whether
it is true or false, and it turns out to be false, an action lies for the fraudu
lent misrepresentation: Id.
Sheri.ff-Indemnity to Bidders.-A sheriff acts officially/, in selling the
property of a stranger to the execution as the property of the defendant
therein. He may take an indemnity from the plaintiff, for such an act,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
when done in good faith, but cannot give an indemnity to the bidders at
the sale: Bell vs. Pratt.
Where an under-sheriff agreed with the bidders at a sheriff's sale to
warrant the title to the property sold, held, that the agreement rested
upon no consideration of benefit to the sheriff, except as it necessarily
tended to increase the fees and perquisites of his office; and that in that
respect it was void, as against public policy: Id.
A sheriff, while in the discharge of his official duty, cannot divest him-
self of his official character, and do as an individual what he cannot do
as a public officer: Id.
Divorce uit-Dower.--The late Court of Chancery had no authority,
in a divorce suit, to require a married woman to accept a gross sum from
her husband in lieu of, and in satisfaction of, her dower. And her
*acceptance of such a sum, in the lifetime of her husband, will not defeat
her dower: Crain vs. Cavana.
Her release of dower, to her husband, pursuant to an order of the
court, although acknowledged in due form, would be a nullity: Id.
Hops Personal Property/.-Hops growing and maturing on the vines,
which are produced by the annual cultivation of the owner, are personal
chattels within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds; and as such are
subject to sale like other personal property: Frank vs. Harrington.
Railroad Companies-LIabillty as Carriers of Passengers.-It is not
unlawful, nor against public policy, for a railroad company to convey
passengers by stage to and from one of its stations and an adjacent village,
in connection with and as a part of its business of transporting passengers
upon its road; nor is a contract made by it thus to carry a passenger,
ultra vires : Buffit vs. Troy and Boston Railroad Company.
Such a contract is lawful, and the corporation is estopped from deny-
ing its validity: Id.
Where a railroad company employs an individual to convey passengers
to and fro between a village and a station on the railroad, in stage-sleighs
furnished, together with the horses and drivers, by him, such company is
liable in damages for any injury sustained by a passenger in consequence
of the overturning of a stage-sleigh through the negligence of the owner
or his servant: Id.
